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I. INTRODUCTION

Praised in some quarters as a useful tool for bringing criminal
perpetrators to justice, criticized by others as a threat to state
sovereignty, universaljurisdiction has certainly emerged as a heated
topic within international criminal law. The term universaljurisdiction
itself refers to a form of jurisdiction in international law which grants
the courts of any state, the ability to bring proceedings with respect to
certain (internationally defined)' crimes, without regard to the
location of the crime, the nationality of the offender, or the
nationality of the victim.2 This form of jurisdiction in effect opens up
certain international crimes for prosecution (within domestic national
courts) anywhere in the world. First introduced in relation to one of
the first international crimes on record, piracy, 3 universaljurisdiction
today has been extended to include the specific international offences
of war crimes,4 crimes against humanity,5 and genocide.6 While the

1.
Such crimes can be defined as crimes under the international (as opposed to domestic)
legal system either through custom or treaty.
2.
See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66 TEXAS L.
REv. 785, 789 (1987-1988); ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 85 (3d
ed. 2007).
3.

See In Re Piracy Jure Gentium, [1934] A.C. 586 (U.K).

4.
See THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 232 (1 ed. 1948); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 308 (5th ed. 1998); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
520 (2d ed. 1999).
5.
See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of the Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I1];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Il]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
6.
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 6, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing InternationalLaw Through Non-Forcible
Measures, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 51 (1997); BASSIOUNI, supra note 4, at 234-235; Douglass
Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes Within the Jurisdictionof the International

Criminal Court, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 426-427 (2001).
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principle of universaljurisdiction has been lauded in some quarters, it
has also faced heavy criticism.7
In 1993, the Kingdom of Belgium enacted a domestic statute, the
Loi du 16 Juin, which codified (in domestic Belgian law) the use and
application of universal jurisdiction (for international crimes) in
Belgian courts. The statute, which went through two major revisions
in February 19999 and April 2003,0 granted Belgian courts
jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide,
regardless of where in the world they took place. While the idea of
universaljurisdiction within international law is not a new one, it has
been argued, with justification, that Belgium's universaljurisdiction
statute was the most extensive and far reaching attempt to date of a
domestic state within the international system sanctioning the widescale use (rather than specific case by case application) of its courts
for trying international crimes.
The Belgian universaljurisdiction statute predictably opened the
country's courts to a flood of litigation; hosts of past and current
world leaders, ranging from President George Bush Sr., to Fidel
Castro, to Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, found themselves being
pursued in the Belgian courts for alleged international criminal
offences. In August 2003, bowing to intense international pressure,
the Belgian Government repealed the country's far reaching universal
jurisdiction statute, and instead incorporated limited provisions for
universal jurisdiction into the country's criminal code (Code Pgnal
Belge) and preliminary title of the code of criminal procedure (Titre
pr~liminairedu Code de procedurepdnale).1' The repealing of Belgium's
universaljurisdiction statute elicited howls of protest across the world by

7.
See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pifalls of UniversalJurisdiction,FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JulyAug. 2001, at 86, (where the author offers up a broad general critique of universal jurisdiction); Jack
Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, The Limits ofldealism, DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, (where the
authors, in discussing the general concept of universal jurisdiction, warn that it has the potential to
engender international conflict).
8.
Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative h la ripression des infractions graves aux Conventions
internationalesde Genhve du 12 aoltt 1949 et aux Protocoles I et 11 du 8juin 1977, additionnels a ces
Conventions [Law ofJune 16, 1993], June 16, 1993 (Moniteur Beige, Aug. 5, 1993) (Belg.).
9.
See Loi relative i la repression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire
[Law of February10, 1999], Feb. 10, 1999 (Moniteur Beige, Mar. 23, 1999) (Beig.).
10.
See Loi modiflant la loi du16 juin 1993 relative 6 la r~pressiondes violations graves du
droit internationalhumanitaireet l'article 144ter du Codejudiciaire. [Law of April 23, 2003], Apr. 23,
2003 (Moniteur Beige, May 7,2003) (Belg.).
11.
See Loi relative h la repression des violations graves du droit internationalhumanitaire
[Law of Aug. 5, 2003], Aug. 5, 2003 (Moniteur Beige, Aug. 7, 2003) (Belg.).
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many in the human rights field who lamented at how a powerful tool for
bringing international criminals to dock had been lost) 2 Legal scholars
were more sanguine in their post-mortems, with many arguing that
Belgium's universal jurisdiction statute, while laudable in theory,
ultimately put the country in an impossible
situation vis-a-vis the other
3
countries within the international system.1
The purpose of this Article is to present a detailed survey on the
history and process of universaljurisdiction as practiced in Belgium from
1993 to the present. Through this detailed presentation, this Article will
conclude with a much more sobering and critical analysis on Belgium's
universaljurisdiction statute than that which has been provided to date by
other legal scholars. This Article will argue that, far from presenting a
powerful tool for justice, Belgium's universaljurisdiction statute violated
fundamental norms of not only international law, but domestic Belgian law
as well. In correcting some of these more egregious violations, the new
Belgian universaljurisdiction scheme that was created by the August 2003
annulment of the country's specialized statute (and subsequent
incorporation of limited provisions for universal jurisdiction into the
Belgian Code Pinal and Titrepr~liminairedu Code de procedurep~nale)
represents a step forward for fundamental justice.
Part II of this Article will provide a brief summary of the basic sources
(i.e. custom and treaty) of international law. Building on the background
provided in Part II on international law generally, part III of this Article
shall explain the basis for universaljurisdictionin international law. Part IV
of this Article will survey the history of universaljurisdiction in Belgium
through a detailed presentation and explanation of the various universal
jurisdiction schemes the country has employed from 1993 to the present
day; it will conclude with a survey of the range of punishments and the
types of specific defenses possible for alleged commissions of international
crimes under the current system of universaljurisdiction in Belgium. Part
V of this Article will present a critical assessment of the various universal
jurisdiction schemes employed by Belgium and explain why the schemes
employed up until August 2003 violated fundamental norms of not only

12. See, e.g., Lauri King-Irani, On LearningLessons: Belgium's UniversalJurisdictionLaw
Under
Threat,
COMMON
DREAMS,
Jun.
25,
2003,
available
at
http'//www.commondreams.org/views03/0625-10.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2009); Belgium: Universal
Jurisdiction Law Repealed, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/08/01/beigium-universal-jurisdiction-law-repealed (last visited Oct.
9, 2009).
13.
See, e.g., Luc Reydams, Belgium Reneges on Universality: The 5 August 2003 Act on
Grave Breaches of InternationalHumanitarian Law, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 679, 679 (2003); Damien
Vandermeerseh, ProsecutingInternationalCrimes in Belgium, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 400, 401 (2005).
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international law, but domestic Belgian law as well; it will end by making a
case why the current universaljurisdiction scheme in place in Belgium post
August 2003 represents a step forward, not backwards, for fundamental
justice.
II. SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (CUSTOM AND TREATY)

Before one can delve into any meaningful discussion of universal
jurisdiction, either in the international context generally, or more
specifically in the context of the domestic Belgian experience, a brief
introduction to the sources of international law must be provided, for only
with such background knowledge firmly understood, can one then go on to
investigate the basis for universaljurisdictionin international and domestic
Belgian law.
A. CustomaryInternationalLaw
Customary international law finds its source in the widespread
consistent practice of states. 14 International custom is seen as a
source of international law because the idea is that if states act in a
particular consistent manner, then such states may be acting in such a
manner because they have a sense of legal obligation-dubbed opinio
juris. If enough states act in said consistent manner for a long enough
period of time, out of a sense of legal obligation, then a new rule of
international law is said to be created."5 The system can thus be seen
as circular in that states are in effect creating a rule, through acting in
conformance to said rule, due to the reason that they feel legally
obligated to do so. Evidence of the development of customary
international law can consist of the statements of foreign ministers,
the
statements
of international
organizations,
diplomatic
correspondence, the opinions of respected legal scholars, etc.
Customary international law also depends upon the consent of nationstates. Consent can either be explicit or implicit. 6 Thus, if a nationstate does not wish to be bound by a new rule of customary
international law, then it must vocally object and (in effect) announce
14.

THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A

NUTSHELL 24-25 (3d ed. 2002).
15.
Note that there can also exist regional customary law that is binding on a group of nationstates in a particular region, but not upon the international system as a whole. See Asylum Case (Colom.
v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Nov. 20, 1950).
16.
I.e., if a rule of customary international law is emerging and a nation-state remains silent,
then this can be seen as giving implicit consent that the nation-state will be bound by the new customary
rule, see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 comment d (1987).
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that it does not view itself as so bound. 7 This objection must be
consistently reiterated, lest it be lost." New nations, it is generally
accepted,' 9 cannot choose between the various rules of customary
international law-they are bound by all of the accepted customary
rules (at the point of independence).20 It matters not that such newly
independent states were unable to object to rules of customary
international law as they were being formed.
Notwithstanding the above, it is important to note, that there are
certain rules of customary international law that are considered so
vital, that they cannot be contracted out by individual states through
treaty-such rules are dubbedjus cogens norms.2 ' Running parallel to
jus cogens norms are what are called obligations erga omnes.
Obligations erga omnes are obligations considered so vital and
important within the international system (usually in the form ofjus
cogens norms), that any state (whether directly affected or not) may
sue another state in order to compel that the obligation be met.22
B. Conventional InternationalLaw
Conventional international law finds its source in "international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states."23 Bilateral treaties are
seen as creating obligations specific to the two states that signed
them. Usually, such conventions or treaties, if only entered into
between two states, are binding on the two states in question, but are
not generally a source of international law. Multilateral treaties, on
the other hand, can transform into sources of customary international
law, binding on all states in the international system, whether they are
parties to the particular treaty or not, if a large enough portion of non-

17.

See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18, 1951).

18.
See Lisa Kline Arnett, Death at an Early Age: InternationalLaw Arguments Against the
Death PenaltyforJuveniles, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 245,260 n. 113 (1988).
19.
For the minority-held contra view see Michel Virally, The Sources of InternationalLaw, in
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 116, 138 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968).
20.
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States), supra note 16, at §
102 comment d.
21.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53, 64, 71, May 23, 1969, 155 U.N.T.S.

331; DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 23 (1st ed. 2001).

22.
Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited. (BeIg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 33 (Feb. 5, 1970); BEDERMAN, supra note 21, at 23.
23.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a), June 26, 1945.
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signatory states in the international system adhere
24 to their provisions
out of a sense of legal obligation, i.e. opiniojuris.
III. THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Before one undertakes a serious discussion on the basis of universal
jurisdiction in international law, it is useful to quickly survey the other
recognized theories of jurisdiction within the system. In addition to
universal jurisdiction, international law traditionally has recognized four
other basic theories of jurisdiction whereby states may claim a legal right to
prosecute alleged crimes. The first, territorialjurisdiction, rests on the
traditional notion of state sovereignty, and holds that a state may assert
jurisdiction over an offence that has taken place on its territory.25 The
second, personnalit6active jurisdiction rests on the idea that a state has an
interest in regulating the behavior of its nationals, and holds that a state may
assert jurisdiction over an offence (even if committed abroad) if the alleged
perpetrator is a national of said state.26 The third, personnalitgpassive
jurisdiction, is the opposite of personnalitM active jurisdiction, and holds
that a state may assert jurisdiction over an offence (even if committed
abroad) if the alleged victim is a national of said state.27 The fourth and
final theory of jurisdiction is based on what is known as the protective
principle-theprotective principlerests on the idea that states have a right to

protect their security and holds that a state may assert jurisdiction over an
offence (even if committed abroad) if said alleged offence is deemed
prejudicial to the state's security (e.g. an alleged coup plot planned abroad,
etc.).28 Of all of these theories of jurisdiction discussed, universal
jurisdiction is perhaps the most primitive in that there is still some
disagreement (amongst scholars and commentators) in regards to how
exactly it operates. 29 These disagreements ultimately boil down to two
competing interpretations within international law of how universal
jurisdictioncan be asserted.

The first interpretation of how universaljurisdiction can be asserted,
which will henceforth be labeled as the expansive interpretation of
universal jurisdiction, holds that if an international offence violates

24.

BUERGENTHAL & MURPuHY, supra note 14, at 24-25.

25.

BEDERMAN, supra note 21, at 175-177; MARK W. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO

INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed. 2003).

26.

BEDERMAN, supra note 21, at 178; Janis, supra note 25, at 325-326.

27.

BEDERMAN, supra note 21, at 181; Janis, supra note 25, at 325-326.

28.

BEDERMAN, supra note 21, at 180; Janis, supra note 25, at 324.

29.

See BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 2, at. 86.

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 16:1

accepted jus cogens norms of international law, then automatically
universaljurisdiction (by any state within the international system) can be
attached. 30 This view has grown out of the idea that once an international
offence crosses the threshold into a violation of a jus cogens norm, then
universal jurisdiction automatically attaches through the erga omnes
obligations of states.3' While32 influential, this first interpretation is by no
means accepted unanimously.
The second interpretation of how universal jurisdiction can be
asserted, which will henceforth be labeled as the limited interpretation of
universaljurisdiction, holds that for universaljurisdiction to attach to an
international offence, there must be some type of consent on the hand of
domestic states within the international system (i.e. states must be given the
option to consent to exercise universaljurisdiction-itis not an obligation
that they are necessarily obligated to assert).3 3 Whether the offence in
question need necessarily be ajus cogens norm, or rather simply any point
of customary or conventional international law, is not a settled question
under the limited interpretationof universaljurisdiction. What is settled is
that the domestic state in question must consent to exercise universal
jurisdiction over a hypothetical offence through either its signature on an
international treaty or domestic enabling legislation, either of which must
34
contain an express grant and acknowledgment of universaljurisdiction.
The natural conclusion of this limited theory of universaljurisdictionwould
then seem to be that domestic states which have consented to the exercise of
universal jurisdiction (either through international treaty or domestic
enabling legislation) could then also limit and control (i.e. through the
establishment of set rules of criminal procedure and the like) the extent to
which the jurisdiction could be utilized.

30.
See Regina v. Bow St. Stipendiary Magis., [1999] 2 ALL E.R 97, 177 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Spain) (where Lord Millet presents this interpretation).
31.
See RANDALL, supra note 2, at 831; Mark R. von Sternberg, A Comparison of the
Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: UniversalJurisdictionand the "Elementary Dictates
of Humanity,22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 151 (1996).
32.

See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE

USE IT 57 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994); Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis,Jus Cogens, and Offences Erga
Omnes, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 265, 277 (2000-2001).
33.

BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 2, at 86.

34.

Id.
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IV. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS PRACTICED IN BELGIUM

(1993-PRESENT)

A. Background on the Belgian Politicaland Legal System
1. Political Background
The Kingdom of Belgium is a constitutional monarchy located at the
western tip of Europe. Politically, the Kingdom functions as a federal state,
with economic, educational, and cultural powers devolved to the three
recognized linguistic communities: Walloon (French speaking), Flemish
(Dutch speaking), and German speaking.35 The criminal law, however, is
handled at the federal level.3 6
2. Legal Background
a. Initiationof a Criminal Case andStructure of the Courts
A criminal case in Belgium begins with a police inquiry which
can be undertaken by the police independently or at the request of a
prejudiced party (this unique feature is known as the constitution departie
civile37 ). The police inquiry is under the nominal control of the Public
Prosecutor (Procureurdu Roi).38 It is on the basis of this inquiry that

35.

ANDRE ALEN & BERNARD TILLEMAN, BELGIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 29 (1 st ed. 1992).

36.
Lieven Dupont & Cyrille Fijnaut, Criminal Law (Belgium), in INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAWS, (CRIMINAL LAW) 9 (R. Blanpain & M. Colucci eds., Supp. Aug. 2009) (1993).
37.

CODE D'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE BELGE [CODE D'INST. CRIM.], art. 63, 66-68 (Belg.).

The constitution de partie civile allows for the alleged victim of a crime to declare themselves a "civil
party" in a written report sent to the Public Prosecutor. The report must contain a request for damages.
The person claiming partie civile status must pay a deposit (to cover legal costs incurred as the result of
the investigation), and must either reside in the district where the claim is being made, or domicile
himself (through the clerk's office) at the Court of First Instance in the district where the claim is being
made. The actual constitution of pattie civile status is made before an investigative judge. By assuming
"civil party" status a person can require that the authorities instigate an investigation (i.e. into the alleged
crime), affect the investigatory and procedural actions of the judge assigned to the case, gain access to
case evidence and records, and even propose procedural steps (i.e. when to obtain a search warrant,
when to initiate an arrest) to the authorities. See also Luc Walleyn, Paper presented at the Social
Science Research Council Workshop on International Justice: The Sabra & Shatila Massacre and the
Belgian Universal Jurisdiction (Nov. 2003) (transcript available at the Social Science Research
Council).
38.
The Public Prosecutor can be thought of as the equivalent of a District Attorney in the
United States. There are twenty-six Public Prosecutor's in the Kingdom of Belgium (one for each
judicial district the county is divided into), who are in turn assisted by Substitutes (the equivalent of
assistant District Attorney's in the United states). See Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at 24. CODE
D'INST. CRIM. art. 22 (Beig.). It should also be noted that the control of the Public Prosecutor in
initiating a case is not absolute, in that under Article 151 of the Belgian Constitution, the Minister of
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the Public Prosecutor decides whether to initiate criminal action or
drop the inquiry." There is no defined procedure for this inquiry.
Rather the Public Prosecutor is charged with simply "identifying the
infraction, collecting the evidence, and delivering the perpetrator."4'
If the decision is made to initiate a case, the Public Prosecutor will
either summon the accused to court in order to begin proceedings, or,
if he feels a more detailed investigation is warranted, summon the
assistance of an investigative judge.4' At the end of this investigation
a decision is made, based on the evidence collected, whether to put
the case on trial or to declare a nonsuit.4 2 A key point to understand
here is that the Public Prosecutor has very little personal discretion,
within this process, on whether to put a case on trial. If the Public
Prosecutor determines that a crime has been committed he must refer
the case for prosecution. 3 If the decision is made to put the case on
trial, the case is then referred to the competent jurisdiction, which has
the final decision on the matter.
Minor offences are tried by the Police Courts, misdemeanors
holding a penalty of imprisonment from eight days to five years are
tried by the Criminal Chamber of the Courts of First Instance; and
serious offences that carry a penalty of death, hard labor, or
imprisonment over five years are tried by the Court of Assizes (in this
jurisdiction, trial by jury is guaranteed). 4 In principle, an appeal is
almost always possible. 45 Appeals are lodged within one of the five
Courts of Appeal. Appeals from the decisions of the Courts of
Appeal are lodged with the Court of Cassation, Belgium's highest
judicial body for non-constitutional affairs. The Court of Cassation is
not empowered to deal with the facts of the case submitted to it;
rather it may only look to issues of law and procedure.' Aside from
the Court of Cassation, sits the Court of Arbitration (the country's

Justice while unable to prevent the Public Prosecutor from undertaking an investigation, can force the
Public Prosecutor to initiate one.
39.

Dupont & Fijnaut, supranote 36, at IN377-378.

40.

CODE D'INST. CRIM. art. 8 (BeIg.).

41.

Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at TV 380-381.

42.

A nonsuit can be thought of as a dismissal of charges.

43.

Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at IM389-392.

44.

ALEN & TILLEMAN, supra note 35, at 206.

45.

Id. at 207.

46.

Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at

356.
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constitutional court),47 which is the only court in the country
empowered to annul
laws passed by either the Federal Parliament or
48
Regional Councils.
b. A Civil Law System
In that the Belgian legal system is a civil or Roman law system,
legislation has more legal significance than past judicial decisions.
Belgian courts are strictly limited to the application of legislation.
Court decisions naturally involve interpretation, but the interpretation
is not precedent that is binding on future courts that must consider the
same legislation.49 The theory then is that Belgian courts look at
legislation anew, and in a vacuum, each time they consider a law."
In reality however, similar decisions made by earlier courts are
important and persuasive authority, though of course, not
controlling." Also, there has evolved in Belgian jurisprudence a
legal principle called jurisprudence constante. Jurisprudence constante
holds that when five judicial decisions regarding a similar subject
52
reach the same result, they acquire the status of a written authority.
Such a status does not mark the decisions as controlling precedent,
but it does cement their position as persuasive authority.
The Belgian Constitution contains several general protections
that relate to the application of criminal law and should thus be kept
in mind: a person may not be prosecuted save in a manner laid down
by law, and in the manner proscribed by said law.53 No prosecution
may be commenced and no penalty may be applied in the absence of
a law." The two above protections constitute what is known in
Belgian Constitutional Law as the principle of legality.55

47.
In 2007 the Court of Arbitration was re-named the Constitutional Court. This being said,
the Court will nevertheless be referred to by its previous name (i.e. the Court of Arbitration) throughout
this Article.
48.

Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at % 8-9.

49.

MoNrrEUR BELGE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BELGIAN CIVIL CODE 3 (John H. Crabb

trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1982).
50.

Id. at 3-4.

51.

Id. at4.

52.

Id.

53.

CONSTITuTION BELGE [CONST. BELG.] art. 12 (Belg.).

54.

Id. at art. 14.

55.
Main De Nauw & Joelle Rozie, Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION TO BELGIUM LAW 402
(Hubert Bocken & Walter De Bondt eds., Kluwer Law International 2001).
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c. The Domestic Statutory Basis for Extra-territorialJurisdiction

As with any typical sovereign nation-state, Belgium reserves the
right to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory
(whether committed by citizens or non-citizens). 6 This being said,
the Code Pnal allows for the extra-territorial application of Belgian
criminal law following the principle of universal jurisdiction, 7 but such
application must be governed by a domestic statute.18 This way it can be
seen that the domestic practice of Belgium conforms to the limited
interpretationof universaljurisdictiondiscussed earlier.
B. UniversalJurisdiction

1. Loi du 16 Juin
The push for a universaljurisdiction in Belgium was actually a
long one, beginning in earnest in the early 1950s when the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs began the process of drafting a universaljurisdiction
statute to meet the country's obligations to prosecute war crimes
under the Geneva Conventions.59 This push eventually stalled, only
to revive again in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the shadow of the
destructive civil wars in Yugoslavia and Somalia, and the genocide in
Rwanda. 60 The movement culminated in the Federal Parliament with
the passage of the Loi du 16 Juin in 1993 which granted domestic
Belgian courts jurisdiction over war crimes.6 ' In 1999, the Loi du 16
Juin was replaced by the Loi du 10 Fjvrier.62 The Loi du 10 Fgvrier
duplicated the Loi du 16 Juin in every respect save that it extended the
international offences covered from just war crimes to also crimes
against humanity and genocide; and that it did not recognize the
official immunity enjoyed (by foreign heads of state and members of
government) under international law.

56.

CODE PtNAL BELGE [CODE PEN. BEL.] art. 3 (BeIg.).

57.

Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at 93.

58.

CODE PEN. BEL. art. 4 (BeIg.).

59.
See Geneva Convention , supra note 5, at art. 49; Geneva Convention H, supra note 5, at
art. 50; Geneva Convention IIL supra note 5, at art 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 5, at art.
146. Walleyn, supra note 37, at IN 3-4.
60.

Walleyn, supra note 37, at IN 5-6.

61.

Law of June 16, 1993, supra note 8, (BeIg.).

62.

Law of February10, 1999, supranote 9, (BeIg.).
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2. Loi du 10 Fvrier

The Loi du 10 Fgvrier granted Belgian courts the universal

jurisdiction to try any of the listed offences (i.e. war crimes,63 crimes
against humanity,' and genocide65 ) that were brought before them,
regardless of where the crime was committed.6 a Jurisdiction under
the statute was based primarily upon subject matter, rather than the
physical presence of either party, or where the offence occurred.
This of course raises the question then of whether the statute allowed
for trials in absentia. In one case brought before it testing this
proposition," the statute was interpreted by the Court of Cassation to
allow for trials in absentia.68 The physical presence of the accused
was thus not required for judicial proceedings to commence.6 9
The Loi du 10 F~vrierwas unusual under Belgian law because it
expressly did not recognize the official immunity enjoyed (by foreign
heads of state and members of government) under international law
(unlike its predecessor, the Loi du 16 Juin, which had).7" As such,
foreign sitting heads of state and government ministers could be
prosecuted under the statute. This being said, in one case brought
before it testing this proposition,7" the Court of Cassation held
63.

Id. at art. 1(3).

64.

Id. at art. 1(2).

65.

Id. at art. I(I).

66.

Id. at art. 7.

67.
The term "one case" is stressed here. If we recall from § IV (A)(2)(a) of this article, the
Court of Cassation does not have the power to judicially review legislation (only the Court of
Arbitration has this power); if we also recall from § IV (A)(2)(b) of this article, Belgium is a civil or
roman law legal system, where the decisions of courts in individual cases are not controlling on others.
68.
Court of Cassation, Case No. P.02.1139.F, at 02.1139.F/4-02.1139F/6, (Feb. 12, 2003)
(Belg.),
available
at
http://www.ulb.ac.be/droitlcdi/SitelDeveloppementsjudiciaires-files/Cassl 2F6vrier2003.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2009).
69.

Id.

70.
Law of February 10, 1999, supra note 9, at art. 5 (3) (Belg.). The reason why the Loi du
10 Fdvrier, unlike the Loi du 16 Juin, did not recognize official immunities rests primarily with the
timing of the revision, 1998-1999, which coincided with the adoption of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. The Belgian minister of justice at the time was specifically influenced by
article 27 of the Rome Statute, in which the International Criminal Court expressly refused to recognize
the traditional immunity enjoyed by sitting heads of state and members of government. See Rapport de
la Commission de la Justice du Senat, Dec. 1, 1998 (Do. No. 1-749/3).
71.
Court of Cassation, at 02.1139.F/6-02.1139.F/9 (Feb. 12, 2003) (BeIg.), available at
http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/edi/Site/Developpements.judiciaires-files/Cass 12F6vrier2003.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2009).
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members of foreign national governments could not be prosecuted
whilst still in office, but instead could only be prosecuted once they
had left office.72 The Court of Cassation based its decision on the
understanding that customary international law had afforded
members of national governments immunity for official acts and thus
a shield73 from
prosecutions whilst in office (immunity ratione
74
materiae ).

The definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide covered in the Loi du 10 Fvrier were designed to
demonstrate that the statute, though a domestic Belgian construction,
was very much an instrument of international law. 75
In its
identification of the covered offences, the statute sought to
incorporate those definitions accepted in international law. As such,
in its definition of the covered offence of war crimes, the statute
referred to and replicated the definitions provided by the relevant
sections of the Geneva Conventions. 6 In its definition of the covered
offence of crimes against humanity, the statute referred to and
replicated the definitions provided by the relevant sections of the
Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (which itself was a
codification of the relevant international law up to that point).77
Finally, in its definition of the covered offence of genocide, the
statute referred to and replicated the definitions provided by the
relevant sections of the Genocide Convention. 8
Despite the fact that it had only been used successfully once, in
the so-called "Butare Four" case, 79 by 2003 the Loi du 10 Fvrierwas
72.

Id.

73.

For a detailed comparison of the absolute immunity rationepersonae (which grants heads

of state, and certain diplomatic officials absolute criminal immunity for all actions committed whilst in
office, both official and otherwise) to the more limited immunity ratione materiae (which grants state
officials immunity for official actions committed while in office), see BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 2,

at 100-02.
74.

Court of Cassation, at 02.1139.F/6-02.1139.F/9 (Feb. 12, 2003) (Belg.), available at

http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/Site/Developpementsjudiciairesfiles/Cassl 2F~vrier2003.pdf
visited Oct. 29, 2009).
75.

(last

Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, Belgium: Act Concerning The Punishmentof Grave

Breaches ofInternationalHumanitarianLaw, 38 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 918, 919 (1999).
76.

Law of February10, 1999, supra note 9, at art. 1(3) (Bel&).

77.

Id. at art. 1(2).

78.

Id. at art.l(l).

79.
The "Butare Four" case involved four Rwandans who had been accused in taking part in
the Rwandan Genocide of the early 1990s. The four had, in the years since the Genocide, taken up
residence in Belgium.

In 2001 the four accused were found guilty under the Loi du 10 Fivrierand
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causing the Belgian Government many problems. Many advocacy
groups had taken advantage of the constitution departiecivile80 to initiate
criminal investigations in the Belgian courts against numerous heads
of state and international personages."
As several of these
investigations involved current or past American Government
officials,82 the U.S. Government warned the Belgian Government that
the status of Brussels as NATO83 Headquarters could be imperiled if
its former and current government officials continued to be targeted."
In a bid to end such actions, which were causing damage to
Belgium's foreign relations with several countries (aside from the
U.S.), the Belgian Parliament decided to radically amend the Loi du
10 Fvrier. The Loi du 10 Fvrierwas amended through the passage of
the Loi du 23 Avri 85 in mid-2003.

3. Loi du 23 Avril
The Loi du 23 Avril amended the Loi du 10 Fvrierin several key

respects. Under the new amendments the Federal Attorney General
of Belgium (Procureurfd~ral) functioned as a gatekeeper of sorts.
For alleged offences (i.e. war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide) which occurred outside of Belgium and in which the victim
or alleged perpetrator were not Belgian citizens and did not live in the
country, the decision of whether to initiate a case would no longer
follow the regular prescribed course of criminal procedure (i.e. in the
hands of individual Public Prosecutors),86 and would instead rest in
the hands of the Federal Attorney General.8 As such, any requests
for the initiation of a criminal case made by alleged victims through
sentenced to lengthy prison terms.

See Luc Reydams, Belgium 's First Application of Universal

Jurisdiction: The Butare Four Case, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 428 (2003), for a detailed discussion of the
case.

80.
81.
890 (2003).

See sources cited and accompanying text, supra note 37.
Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 888,

82.
Id. A list which included former President George Bush Sr., former secretary of Defense
and current Vice-President Dick Cheney, and former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and current
Secretary of State Colin Powell.

83.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

84.

See Richard Bernstein, Belgium Rethinks Its ProsecutorialZeal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003,

85.

See Law ofApril 23, 2003, supranote 10 (Belg.).

86.

See supra § IV (A)(2)(a).

87.

See Law ofApril 23, 2003, supranote 10 at art. 5 (BeIg.).

at A8.
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the constitution de partie civile process would also be controlled through the
Federal Attorney General. The result of this provision was to, in effect, strip
away the option of constitution de partie civile from alleged victims. Under
normal Belgian criminal procedure, the process for obtaining partiecivile status
is to simply file the relevant report88 with the Public Prosecutor of one's
district-if the report is properly filed partie civile status must be granted.8 9 By
granting the Federal Attorney General control (and veto) over the process, the Loi
du 23 Avril amendments to the Loi du 10 Fivrierwere annulling the option of
constitution departiecivile through the back door.
Under the Loi du 23 Avril amendments to the Loi du 10 Fivrier, once
presented with a complaint, the Federal Attorney General was required to request
that an investigative judge investigate it unless it was determined to be unfounded
or not actionable under the statute.90 In addition, the Federal Attorney General
could decide to transfer the charges at issue to either the state in which
the crime was committed or to the state where the alleged perpetrator
lived as long as either state was judged to have "competent,
independent, impartial, and fair" courts.9 ' These states would also
have to guarantee the parties the "right to due process" and have
legislation in place that criminalized the alleged offence(s).92 A third
option allowed the Federal Attorney General to transfer the case to
a
93
competent international tribunal (including the International Criminal Court).
The ratione materiae immunity granted to the officials of foreign
state governments under international law was recognized by the
amendments provided by the Loi du 23 Avril.9 4 This being said
however, it should bear noting that the more expansive ratione
personae immunity granted by international law to sitting heads of
state was not recognized. 95
The intended effects of the amendments made by the Loi du 23
Avril to the Loi du 10 Fivrierwere to filter out of the Belgian judicial
system the great majority of criminal suits that had been filed against
various heads of state and international personages under the Loi du
10 F~vrier (through utilizing the Federal Attorney General to act as a
gatekeeper for all actions brought under the statute).
88.

See sources cited and accompanying text, supra note 37.

89.

CODE D'INST. CRim. art. 66 (Beig.).

90.

See Law of April 23, 2003, supra note 10 at art. 5 (BeIg.).

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id. at art. 4(3).

95.

See sources cited and accompanying text, supra note 73.
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Despite the limiting provisions added to the Loi du 1O Fivrierby
the amendments provided by the Loi du 23 Avril, the Belgian
Government decided to, in August 2003, completely repeal the Loi du
1O Feivrier, and instead incorporated limited provisions for universal
jurisdiction into the country's criminal

code (Code Pinal) and

preliminary title of the code of criminal procedure (Titre
prgliminairedu
96
Aort.
5
du
Loi
the
through
penale)
Code de procedure
4. Loi du 5 Aofit
The Loi du 5 Aoft radically altered the universaljurisdiction scheme

in place in Belgium up to that point. The act completely repealed the Loi
du 10 Fvrier97 and instead incorporated selected provisions from it into the
Code P~nal and Titre priliminaire du Code de procedure pinale. The

universal jurisdiction scheme employed by Belgium from this point
onwards would be much more restrictive in scope than what had preceded
it.

The Loi du 5 Aofit folded in the offences of war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide originally covered by the now
repealed Loi du 10 F~vrier into Article 136 of the Code Pgnal.98 The

definitions of what constituted the listed offences (i.e. war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide) were the same as those employed by
the Loi du 10 Fgvrier (which, recall', sought to incorporate those
definitions accepted in international law).
Much like the amendments made to the Loi du 10 F~vrierby the
Loi du 23 Avril, the Loi du 5 Aoft also sought to draft the Federal

Attorney General of Belgium as a gatekeeper for complaints. The
key difference, however, was that the universe of complaints open to
the Federal Attorney General to monitor was reduced considerably.
No longer could Belgian courts claim jurisdiction over international
offences (i.e. war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide)
which occurred outside of Belgium and in which the victim or
alleged perpetrator were not Belgian residents. The newly amended
Article 6 of the Titre pr~liminairedu Code de procedure p~nale granted

Belgian courts jurisdiction for offences only if committed abroad by a
Belgian citizen or resident; 99 whilst the newly amended Articles 10
and 12 of the Titre priliminairedu Code de procedure pdnale granted

96.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supranote 11 (BeIg.).

97.

Id. at art. 27.

98.

Id. at arts. 6-8.

99.

Id. at art. 14.
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Belgian courts jurisdiction for offences committed against Belgian
citizens or residents. °° For such cases, the decision of whether to
initiate a case would no longer follow the regular prescribed course
of criminal procedure (i.e. in the hands of individual Public
Prosecutors),' 0 ' but would instead rest in the hands of the Federal
Attorney General. 0 2 As such, any requests for the initiation of a
criminal case made by alleged victims through the constitution departie
civile process would also be controlled through the Federal Attorney General.
Much like in the case of the similar provision in the Loi du 23 Avril,10 3 the net
effect of this provision was to strip away the option of constitution departiecivile
from alleged victims. Recall that under normal Belgian criminal procedure, the4
process for obtaining partie civile status is to simply file the relevant report' 0
with the Public Prosecutor of one's district-if the report is properly filed partie
civile status must be granted.'0° By granting the Federal Attorney General
control (and veto) over the process, the Loi du 5 Aofit amendments to Article 10
of the Titre prliminairedu Code de procedurepnale were annulling the
option of constitution departiecivile through the back door.

Under the Loi du 5 Aofit amendments to Articles 10 and 12 of the Titre
prliminairedu Code de procddurep~nale, once presented with a complaint,

the Federal Attomey General was required to request that an investigative judge
investigate it unless it was determined to be unfounded or not actionable. 0 6 In
addition, the Federal Attorney General could decide to transfer the charges at
issue to either the state in which the crime was committed or to the
state where the alleged perpetrator lived as long as either state was
judged to have "competent, independent, impartial, and fair"
courts.0 7 A second option allowed the Federal Attorney General to transfer
the case to a competent intemational tribunal (including the International
Criminal Court). 0 8 The net effect of these new amendments was to create a
more flexible, fair, and rational system of universaljurisdiction. Unlike Public
Prosecutors who, recall, 1°9 have very little discretion in choosing whether to refer

100.

Id. at art. 16, 18.

101.

See supra § IV (A)(2)(a).

102.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11 at art. 16, 18 (Beig.).

103.

See supra § IV (B)(3).

104.

See sources cited and accompanying text, supra note 37.

105.

See CODE D'INST. CRIM. art. 66 (BeIg.).

106.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11, at art. 16, 18 (BeIg.).

107.

Id. atart. 16, 18.

108.

Id.atart. 18.

109.

See supra § IV (A)(2)(a).
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a case for prosecution, and must prosecute if evidence of a crime is uncovered
during the course of the initial investigation; the Federal Attorney General under
the new scheme could (subject to judicial oversight) pursue other options.
Unlike the Loi du 23 Avril amendments to the Loi du 10 F~vrier
which, recall, while recognizing the narrower ratione materiae
immunity granted to officials of foreign state governments under
international law, did not recognize the more expansive ratione
personae immunity granted by international law to sitting heads of
state,1 0 the Loi du 5 Aofit amendments to Article 1 of the Titre
prliminaire du Code de proc~dure p~nale, recognized both ratione
materiae and rationepersonae immunity for the listed offences. 1 '
In late March 2005, responding to a suit launched by the Ligue
des droits de l'homme, and the Liga voor Mensenrechten, a pair of
Walloon and Flemish human rights organizations respectively,
Belgium's Court of Arbitation, the country's constitutional court
(which is the only court in the country empowered to annul laws
12
passed by either the Federal Parliament or Regional Councils),'
annulled Articles 10 and 12 of the Titre prliminaire du Code de
procdurepinale as amended by the Loi du 5 Aoit. 13
The plaintiffs argued that by folding violations of international
criminal law (i.e. war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide) into
the Code P~nal, the Belgian government had expressed a willingness to
treat such crimes in the same manner in which all other crimes in the Code
Penal were governed." 4 Given this, the plaintiffs argued that it was not
unreasonable to expect that the constitution departiecivile"5 process would be
available to prejudiced parties (i.e. just as it was available for other offences in the
Code PgnaT).1 6 The plaintiffs argued that the different treatment afforded to
victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide versus the
treatment afforded to the victims of other Code P~nal offences was contrary to
both the European Convention of Human Rights (Article 6) and the
Constitution of Belgium (Articles 10 and 11).117
The Court of Arbitration found that indeed Articles 10 and 12 of the
Titre prliminairedu Code de procedurep~nale as amended by the Loi du 5
110.

See supra § IV (B)(3).

111.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11, at art. 13 (BeIg.).

112.

See supra § IV (A)(2)(a).

113.

See Court of Arbitration, Case No. 62/2005, at 16 (Mar. 23, 2005) (BeIg.).

114.

Id. at 3.

115.

See sources cited and accompanying text, supra note 37.

116.

Court of Arbitration, Case No. 62/2005, at 3 (Mar. 23, 2005) (BeIg.).

117.

Id. at 4.
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Aofit had created a difference in the way different victims were treated (i.e.
through the preclusion of the constitution departiecivile for alleged victims of
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide)."' This being said, the
Court also found that the Federal Parliament had the right to limit universal
jurisdictionprosecutions in the countlry (given the adverse affect they could have
on the country's international relations)." 9 However, in not allowing for any
judicial oversight of the Federal Attorney General's power to allow for or reject
prosecutions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed
abroad, 120 the Federal Parliament had not tailored a solution that narrowly fit the
goal it wished to pursue.' 2 ' While it was not unreasonable to give the Federal
Attorney General control over the process, 22 it was unreasonable23not to provide
some judicial oversight over the Federal Attorney General's role.'
In response to the Court of Arbitration's decision to annul Articles 10 and
12 of the Titre prgliminairedu Code de procdure pdnale as amended by
the Loi du 5 Aofit, the Belgian Government passed additional amendments
to Articles 10 and 12 of the Titre priliminairedu Code de procedure
pdnale which would put them in line with the requirements requested by the
Court of Arbitration (i.e. the gatekeeper role of the Federal Attorney
General be subject to judicial oversight). The new amendments to Articles
10 and 12 of the Titre pr~liminairedu Code de procedure p~nale were
made by the Loi du 22 Mai 24 passed in mid-2006.
5. Loi du 22 Mai
The Loi du 22 Mai added more amendments (in addition to those already
made by the Loi du 5 Aofit) to Articles 10 and 12 of the Titre pr~liminaire
du Code de procedure pbnale. The amendments were designed to add
significant judicial oversight to the role of the Federal Attorney General in
deciding whether to prosecute complaints arising out of offences (listed
within Article 136 of the Code Pinal as amended by the Loi du 5 Aofat)
committed abroad by Belgian citizens/residents or involving Belgian
citizens/residents as victims. Under the new amendments, the decision of
118. Id. at 11.
119.

Id.at 13.

120.

Le. where Belgian citizens/residents were either the perpettators or victims.

121.

Court of Arbitration, Case No. 62/2005, at 13 (Mar. 23, 2005) (Belg.).

122. Id. at 13-14.
123.

Id.at 14-15.

124. See Loi modifiant certaines dispositions de la loi du 17 avril 1878 contenant le Titre
prliminairedu Code de procidure pdnale, ainsi qu'une disposition de la loi du 5 aofit 2003 relative aux
violations graves de droit internationalhumanitaire, [Law of May 22, 2006]. May 22, 2006 (Moniteur
Beig, Jul. 7, 2006) (Belg.).
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the Federal Attorney General not to pursue a case was subject to review by
an appellate panel of judges. 2 5 In this way, the procedure for universal
jurisdiction in Belgium was brought into balance. A happy medium was
reached between the need to provide flexibility in the decision of whether to
initiate a criminal prosecution and the very real need to guard against
concentrating too much power over the process in the hands of a single
judicial officer (i.e. the Federal Attorney General).
C. Punishment andDefenses (under Belgium's Current Universal
JurisdictionScheme)
As the admittedly lengthy survey of Belgium's experience with universal
jurisdiction has shown, the country has moved from a formerly expansive
scheme, governed by special statute, to one more limited in scope, governed by
Articles 6 (listing the class of perpetrator punishable ) and 136 (listing the
offenses that can be prosecuted) of the Code Pnal;and Articles 10 and 12 of
the Titre prdliminairedu Code de procdure pdnale (listing the class of
victims covered, and the procedure through which prosecution can
commence). Given this, a survey can now be undertaken of the range of
punishments and the types of specific defenses possible for alleged
commissions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide under
the current universaljurisdictionscheme in place in Belgium.
1. Punishment
Article 136 of the Code Pdnal (as amended by the Loi du 5 Aofit)
enumerates specific mandatory minimum sentences for the offences
covered; the penalties range from sentences of ten to fifteen years
imprisonment to life imprisonment. 6 However, just because Article
136 of the Code PRnal contains mandatory minimum sentences does
not mean that the sentencing judge must apply said sentences. The
criminal law of Belgium requires the sentencing judge to reduce the
punishment if there are mitigating factors that ought be considered.'2 7

Along this same vein, extenuating circumstances can also be taken
28 as can considerations relating to the personality of the
into account,
29
defendant.

125.

Id. at art. 2.

126.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11, at art. 9 (BeIg.).

127.

CODE PEN. BEL. art. 78 (BeIg.).

128. Id. at arts. 79-85.
129. De Nauw & Rozie, supra note 55, at 417.
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Article 136 of the Code Pdnal also covers a range of defendants.
It covers those responsible for the commission of the offences
covered, as well as those contributors whose role is limited to aiding
in the commission of the offence by facilitating their commission or
by manufacturing, constructing, transporting, converting any
construction with the knowledge that said construction is intended to
be used in the commission of the covered offences. 3 '
Article 136 of the Code P~nal provides for the punishment of
non-completed breaches (attempt). It makes it a crime to issue orders
to commit a covered offence, give proposals to commit a covered
offence, partake in incitement to commit a covered offence, and fail
to act to prevent a covered offence. 3 '
The criminal law of Belgium holds that attempts to commit an
offence are indeed punishable, but that they require three elements:
the commencement of execution, a criminal intent, and a nonvoluntary withdrawal (i.e. in the event withdraw occurs).'32 The first
two elements are self explanatory, but the last element bears some
discussion. If a withdrawal is undertaken voluntarily by the offender,
then the offender cannot be held guilty of attempt. 33 Thus, if an
offender gives a proposal to commit a covered offence, but then
voluntarily retracts the proposal (i.e. before they have been acted
upon); he cannot be found guilty of having committed a punishable
attempt.
Article 136 of the Code P~nal provides for the punishment of
participators in a covered offence by making it a crime to participate
in the commission of such an offence.'34 Note that Belgian criminal
law marks a distinction between contributors to the commission of an
offence and participators to the commission of an offence.
The criminal law of Belgium holds that those who play a crucial
participatory role in the commission of a crime are labeled as
coauteurs.'3 5 Those who play a secondary participatory role in the
commission of a crime are labeled as complices. 36 Coauteurs
contribute directly to the commission of a crime, while complices

130.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11, at art. 10 (Belg.).

131.

Id. at art. 11.

132.

CODE PEN. BEL. art. 51 (BeIg.).

133.

Id.

134. See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11, at art II (Beig.).
135.

CODE PEN. BEL. art. 66 (BeIg.).

136.

Id. at art. 67.
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grant useful aid and assistance.' 7 Coauteurs are subject to the same
punishment as the actual perpetrators of a crime,' 38 while complices
are subject to a lesser punishment.139
2. Defenses
a. Available Defenses
The criminal law of Belgium provides for numerous criminal
defenses:
self defense and the defense of others, 4 ° physical
duress, 4 ' psychological duress, 4 2 mistake and ignorance,'43
insanity,'" and consanguinity and affinity.'45 These defenses are
available to defendants charged under Article 136 of the Code Pnal
(as amended by the Loi du 5 Aofit) for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide.
b. RestrictedDefenses
Article 136 of the Code P~nal explicitly restricts several of the
defenses found in other sections of the Code Pnal and related
jurisprudence. The defense of necessity to act in the national interest
is expressly prohibited. 4 6 Thus, a defendant would be unable to
argue that even though he committed a covered offence, he was
justified in doing so because he was protecting the national interests
of his country (e.g. fighting terrorism, fighting invasion, etc.). The
defense of obedience to set law and command of authority'47 is
expressly prohibited.'48 Thus, a defendant would be unable to argue
that even though he committed a covered offence, he was justified in

137.

De Nauw & Rozie, supra note 55, at 414.

138.

CODE PEN. BEL. art. 80 (BeIg.).

139.

Id. at art. 81.

140.

Id. at art. 416.

141.

Id.at art. 71.

142.

Id.

143. Not found in the Code Pinal but recognized by jurisprudence, see De Nauw & Rozie,
supra note 55, at 414.
144.

De Nauw & Rozie, supra note 55, at 412.

145.

CODE PEN. BEL. art. 462 (BeIg.).

146.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11, at art 12 (BeIg.)..

147.

CODE PEN. BEL. art. 70 (BeIg.).

148.

See Law ofAugust 5, 2003, supra note 11, at art, 12 (BeIg.).
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doing so because he was acting in accordance to set law or because
he was simply obeying the orders of a legal authority or superior.
V. AN ASSESSMENT OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AS PRACTICED IN
BELGIUM

Despite protests in some quarters,'49 the repeal of the Loi du 10
Fgvrier and subsequent radical restructure of Belgium's universal
jurisdiction scheme which followed, produced a new scheme (i.e.
Articles 6 and 136 of the Code Pnal coupled with Articles 10 and 12 of
the Titre priliminaire du Code de procedure p~nale) that was, on the

whole, a big improvement over all that had preceded it. Aside from the
much needed judicial discretion that the new scheme introduced, the old
scheme (i.e. the Loi du 10 Fgvrier)violated fundamental norms of not only
international law, but domestic Belgian law as well, and as such, was
rightly repealed by the Belgian Government.
A. Trials in Absentia

In international law, the general distaste for trials in absentia is clearly
present. Article 14 (3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights expressly prohibits trials in absentia. 50 Article 63 of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court requires that the accused
be present at his trial. 5'
Recall that the Loi du Fgvrier had been interpreted, at least in one
case," to allow for trials in absentia'5 3 (i.e. the presence of accused

149.

See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12.

150. InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(3)(d), Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. Article 14(3)(d) reads as follows:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality ... [t]o be tried in
his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right;
and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of
justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not
have sufficient means to pay for it.
Id.
151. Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, art 63, Jul. 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
Article 63 reads as follows: "The accused shall be present during the trial."
152.

See sources cited and accompanying text, supra note 67.

153.

See supra § IV (3)(2).
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not being required).'54 While trials in absentia are not expressly
prohibited in Belgian law, they are considered highly extraordinary
and rare.' 55 Indeed, in the case just referenced (i.e. where the Court
of Cassation allowed for a trial in absentia under the Loi du 10 Fgvrier
to proceed), the Public Prosecutor expressly argued against such a
judgment, reasoning that trials in absentia were per se violative of
international law and would violate the right of the accused to a fair
trial. 156 With the new universal jurisdiction scheme in place in
Belgium, the decision whether to pursue and investigate an alleged
offence, subject to judicial oversight, is in the hands of the Federal
Attorney General and not the alleged victims through the constitution
de partie civile.'57 With such wide-ranging discretion placed in the hands of a
national judicial officer, one can expect that the traditional rarity in Belgian law
of absentia trials will continue in respect to the international offences now
covered by Article 136 of the Code Pnal. Such a development can only be
welcomed as it will ensure that any future universal jurisdiction
prosecutions undertaken in Belgium will conform to the minimum
procedural standards of international law. That any future trials in Belgium
adhere to these minimum standards is important, as it will help counter
backdoor criticism, by those seeking to mask their absolute opposition to
the investigation and bringing to justice of those accused of violating
international criminal law, through a critique of the procedures through
which any accused are tried.
B. Official Immunities

The absolute rationepersonae immunity enjoyed by heads of state and
certain diplomatic officials, and the more limited ratione materiae
immunity enjoyed by other various government members 58 is a well
entrenched norm of international law.'" 9 The International Court of Justice,
in no uncertain terms, has confirmed the absolute bar to prosecution that
immunity ratione personae confers upon the holder.' 60 While national
154. Court of Cassation, at 02.1139.F/4-02.1139.F/6 (Feb. 12, 2003) (BeIg.), available at
(last
http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/cdi/Site/Developpementsjudiciaires-files/Cass!2F~vrier2003.pdf
visited Oct. 29, 2009).
155.

Walleyn, supra note 37, at

156.

Id.

157.

See sources cited and accompanying text, supranote 37.

158.

See sources cited and accompanying text, supranote 73.

159.

See BANTEKAS & NASH, supra note 2, at 96-111.

160.
14,2002).

28-29.

Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 20-22 (Feb.
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courts have upheld immunity ratione materiae for official acts with narrow
exceptions for violations of international crimes (e.g. torture), which have
been held, by some national courts, as not constituting official acts. 16 ' This
understanding of international law, as related to the well entrenched place
of sovereign immunities in international law, is not only accepted in
domestic Belgian
law 162 but has also been affirmed by the Court of
63
Cassation.'

Recall that the Loi du 10 Fvrier did not recognize, prior to the
amendments provided by the Loi du 23 Avril, rationepersonae immunity

(as defined under international law); nor did it recognize, prior to the
amendments provided by the Loi du 5 Aoat, ratione materiae immunity
(as defined under international law)." Such a seeming violation of a
well established norm of international law led directly to an
International Court of Justice decision in February 2002 when the
Court, addressing a suit by the Democratic Republic of Congo
(D.R.C.) against Belgium for an international arrest warrant (filed
under the Loi du 10 Fgvrier) issued by Belgium for the D.R.C.'s sitting
foreign minister, found that immunity rationaepersonae was a well
established norm of customary international law (resulting in the

161. See generally Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magis., [1999] 2 All E.R. 97, (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Spain) but see Al-Adsani v. UK, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, M55-66 (2002) (where the
Court held that the prohibition against violations of fundamental norms of international law, including
jus cogens, must be interpreted in a way that did not violate other accepted norms of international law,
such as state immunities.).
162.

See Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at j 102-104.

163. See Court of Cassation, at 02.1139.F/4-02.1139.F/6 (Feb. 12, 2003) (Belg.), available at
http://www.ulb.ac.be/droit/edi/Site/Developpementsjudiciaires-files/Cassl2Fvrier2003.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2009). Given the well established historical acceptance of the concept of official
immunities in customary international law, the question can be posed of why the international criminal
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), as well as the International Criminal
Court (ICC) do not recognize official immunities in their respective criminal procedures? The answer to
this question is a simple one--well rooted in international law. Both the ICTY and ICTR were
established up by the United Nation's executive arm (the Security Council) through a binding Chapter
VII resolution. As members of the United Nations, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and their assorted neighbors
were treaty bound to comply with the Security Council's "opt-out" from the accepted customary
international law on official immunities. This same reasoning applies to the ICC, an organization
created via a treaty (i.e. the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) ratified by all of its
members which, amongst other things, specifically states that the ICC will not recognize official
immunities.
164. It is interesting to note that while the Loi du 10 Fivrier did not recognize official
immunities for foreign leaders and government officials, domestic Belgian law provided absolute
rationae personae immunity for the King of Belgium, and rationae materiae immunity for Belgian
government officials. See Dupont & Fijnaut, supra note 36, at 91100-101.

Baker

2009]

Belgian arrest warrant being quashed).' 65 With the new universal
jurisdiction scheme in place in Belgium, the International Court will
hopefully rest easy for, as has been discussed, the Loi du 5 Aofit
amendments to Article 1 of the Titre prgliminairedu Code de procedure
p~nale means that both ratione personae and ratione materiae immunity

are recognized in Belgium (i.e. for complaints arising out of alleged war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed abroad by

Belgian citizens/residents or involving Belgian citizens/residents as
victims).
VI. CONCLUSION
Far from being a step backwards, the new universal jurisdiction
scheme in place in Belgium post 2003 represents a positive step not only for
international law, but, as has been seen, domestic Belgian law as well. The
use of universaljurisdictionis an evolving norm of international law and as
such must be carefully nurtured by the international community of states if

it is to survive and prosper as a functional and accepted addition to the law
of nations. In their rush to punish, admittedly abhorrent, international
criminals, the community of nations should be careful not to violate the
accepted rules of the international system. As has been seen with Belgian
universaljurisdictionscheme during the 1993-2003 period, it is often quite
easy for states to fall into this trap. Yet, just as Belgium provides a
cautionary tale, it also illuminates a way out of the darkness. The universal
jurisdiction scheme in place in the country today is a model of conformity
both to international legal rules, and the domestic Belgian norms as well.
Ultimately, the story of universaljurisdictionin Belgium has turned out to
be a positive one. It is on these positives that current legal scholars should
focus on and future legal scholars can learn from.

165.

See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J. at 24-25.

